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Performance alone is insufficient to assess the total impact of changing 
mission parameters on a space mission concept, architecture, or campaign; 
the benefit, cost, and risk must also be understood. This paper examines the 
impact to benefit, cost, and risk of changing the total mission duration of a 
human Mars orbital mission. The changes in the sizing of the crew habitat, 
including consumables and spares, was assessed as a function of duration, 
including trades of different life support strategies; this was used to assess the 
impact on transportation system requirements. The impact to benefit is 
minimal, while the impact on cost is dominated by the increases in 
transportation costs to achieve shorter total durations. The risk is expected to 
be reduced by decreasing total mission duration; however, large uncertainty 
exists around the magnitude of that reduction.  
I. Introduction 
When developing a space mission concept, architecture, or campaign, there are certain mission 
parameters (drivers) that, when changed, significantly alter the behavior of the design space with 
respect to the key decision-making metrics: benefit, cost, and risk.  Often, the impact (the effect of 
changing a mission parameter on decision-making metrics) of these drivers is measured with 
respect to changes in performance, such as mass or efficiency.  However, the total impact (beyond 
the scope of performance) must be considered to make an informed judgement on the importance 
or influence of that driver.  The total impact is the change in benefit delivered by the mission, the 
change in cost to perform the mission, and the change in risk to the mission.  In this context, the 
performance of the mission, rather than being the sole decision-making metric, is the mechanism by 
which the driver is changed to alter the benefit, cost, and risk.   
One such driver is the total duration for a human Mars orbital mission. With current technology, 
transit to and from Mars takes months to years to complete, with stays in the sphere of influence of 
Mars ranging from a month to five hundred days. Hundreds to thousands of tons of mass must be 
launched to perform this mission. This behavior of the transportation architecture has implications 
for the rest of the mission: habitation systems must be designed to support the crew for these long 
durations away from Earth, systems must be highly reliable and/or reparable, and the required 
technologies and systems require significant investment. These requirements may be relaxed if the 
total duration of the mission can be reduced; however, reducing duration carries with it its own set 
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of challenges. Thus, a need exists to understand these challenges to determine the value of investing 
in reducing total mission duration. 
This paper assesses the sensitivity of the total impact of a given driver: the impact of changing 
the total mission duration for a human Mars orbital mission. This paper includes a discussion of the 
quantitative and qualitative means to assess the three impacts (benefit, cost, and risk) in a human 
Mars orbital mission.  The two performance trades used to achieve lower mission durations are 
mission design changes and propulsion technology advances. These performance trades on the 
transportation system, in conjunction with the impact of reduced mission duration on other 
elements (e.g. the crew habitat), are used to inform the assessment of impacts on benefit, cost, and 
risk. 
II. Background 
A human Mars orbital mission is defined here as a mission that sends humans to Mars orbit 
without going to the surface.  This enables missions to Mars before the entry vehicle, surface 
elements, and ascent vehicle are developed.  In Martian orbit, the crew would be able to teleoperate 
robotics on the surface, observe Mars from orbit, and complete other mission objectives.  The crew 
would live in a deep space habitat in transit to and from Mars, as well as while in orbit.  Traditional, 
high-thrust conjunction class missions have durations in Mars orbit on the order of 500-600 days 
and transit times up to 250 days each way.  Throughout this entire mission, the crew is exposed to 
deep space radiation and, assuming traditional habitat design, microgravity.   
In assessing mission concepts (such as a Mars orbital mission) and informing capability 
investment choices, systems analysts typically will consider the mass impact of trades such as 
choosing to perform an orbital mission instead of a surface mission to Mars, or using different 
propulsion technologies to change transit time.  An indicator of this tendency is the prevalent use of 
Initial Mass in Low Earth Orbit (IMLEO) as a comparison metric [1].  Understanding the impact on 
mass alone, however, only provides partial knowledge. Other impacts must also be considered 
when making a decision, such as:  
● the added benefit gained during the mission due to the use of a new technology;  
● the difference in cost from development, production, launch, and operations of the mission; 
and  
● the difference in risk to the crew or systems due to new operational modes or technologies.      
An example of this tendency is represented by historical studies on the benefits of in-situ 
resource utilization (ISRU) for Mars surface missions.  From research into ISRU propellant 
production studies, Jones (2016) found that previous attempts at determining the degree of savings 
provided by ISRU propellant concentrate on either reductions in mass on the Mars surface or 
IMLEO [1].  These studies did not take into account the non-trivial cost to develop and implement 
the ISRU infrastructure to create that propellant.  While some studies in the literature [2,3] have 
acknowledged this fact, quantitative assessments of the other impacts (benefit, cost, and risk) are 
an underexplored area of research in ISRU for Mars surface missions. Similarly, the assessment of 
other metrics besides mass allow for better understanding of the full impact of choices in a trade 
space. 
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III. Total Impact of a Mars Orbital Mission 
This paper will explore the total impact, including benefit, cost, and risk, of changing the total 
mission duration of a Mars orbital mission.  This analysis will also consider the various propulsion 
trades available to achieve this reduction in total mission duration.  Figure 1 presents an overview 
of this process.  The impacts of the driver, Mars Orbital Total Mission Duration, are on the right 
while the trades to enable that driver are on the left.  This figure also presents the initial findings of 
the relative importance of each impact and trade which are discussed further in the following 
section. A major impact or trade is one that has the potential to significantly alter the behavior of a 
decision (e.g. the impacts of radiation on crew health may determine whether a mission can even be 
attempted at all). A minor impact or trade is one that on its own does not significantly alter the 
behavior of a decision, but in conjunction with others may prove significant (e.g. habitat costs on 
their own do not drive the behavior of cost, but in conjunction with the costs of spares, are on the 
order of transportation costs for long durations). A minimal impact or trade is one that is unlikely 
to alter the behavior of a decision, regardless of the value of the driver (e.g. prestige depends only 
on whether or not the mission is successful; it is unaffected by duration). Validated assessments are 
based on quantitative analysis presented in this paper; presumed assessments are based on expert 
solicitation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of Process to Assess Total Impact 
A. Benefit 
Benefit is tied to the “why” of a mission; that is, a mission exists to provide benefit. This paper 
proposes several components of benefit with respect to a human Mars orbital mission: increased 
exploration, prestige, public engagement, and increased learning curve. Each of these components 
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was evaluated across a range of mission durations to estimate the magnitude and nature of the 
change in benefit as a function of mission duration. The four components and their relationship 
with total mission duration are presented in Table 1. The degree of exploration that can be 
completed (e.g. via tele-operation of surface assets) in an orbital mission depends on stay time in 
the Mars vicinity rather than total mission duration. The national prestige of a Mars mission is a 
binary variable tied to the success or failure of the mission; there is no dependency on either total 
duration or transit time. Faster pacing between missions increases public engagement and the rate 
at which lessons learned from previous missions can be applied to subsequent missions; however, 
this is not solely a function of mission duration, but also depends on opportunities and funding to 
support those subsequent missions. In summary, decreased total mission duration has minimal 
impact on benefit for a Mars orbital mission as described here. Other potential benefits not included 
in this assessment include advances in technology and related spinoffs that may result from shorter 
or longer mission durations. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the Benefit Impact 
Component Description 
Increased 
Exploration 
Benefit increases with stay time (from decreases in transit time combined with 
fixed total duration) by providing more time for tele-operated surface science. 
Prestige National prestige from being the first to go to Mars has no dependency on total 
duration or transit time; it only depends on whether the mission is successful. 
Public 
Engagement 
Shorter time between publicly interesting events (Earth launch, Mars arrival, 
Earth return) may increase public support/enthusiasm for mission; interest 
decreases rapidly between events. 
Learning Curve Shorter total durations may allow for more frequent missions to Mars or 
spacing between missions, which provides more opportunities to apply 
lessons-learned to subsequent missions. 
B. Cost 
The cost impact incorporates the total cost of the campaign including the costs for the habitat 
(development and production), spares, launch, and operations.  Transportation system costs are 
excluded in this analysis, because they are considered an independent variable that drive the 
shorter mission durations.   The habitat cost and the spares cost are closely tied to the total mission 
duration, but factors such as life support closure affect the sensitivity of those costs.  The launch 
cost, similarly to the in-space transportation system cost, are more closely tied to the performance 
trades and thus can vary significantly for different options. The fixed costs for operations are 
assumed to dominate any dependence on total mission duration, an assumption that needs to be 
verified with further analysis. Table 2 presents an overview of the components of the cost impact. 
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Table 2: Overview of the Cost Impact 
Component Description 
Habitat Cost The cost of the habitat system, which includes the structure, life 
support, power, and other systems, scales to account for varying total 
mission duration. 
Spares Cost The cost for spare parts to account for system failures, which increases 
with total mission duration, depends heavily on the life support closure 
strategy. 
Launch Costs The cost to deliver mass to orbit is modeled as a linear function of mass 
to be launched. 
Operations Costs Operation of ground systems, flight control, etc. tend to have high fixed 
costs, which implies weak correlation with mission duration.  
 
Figure 2 presents the habitat mass across a range of total mission duration from a few days to a 
few years.  For the parametric cost estimating methodology employed in this study, the cost of a 
space system is a strong function of the mass of the system when heritage is held constant (across 
sizes).  Decreasing total mission duration has a strong impact on habitat dry mass below ~300 days, 
while total habitat mass is primarily driven by spares and consumables (strong dependency on 
mission duration) above ~300 days.  These trends are driven by the transition at 300 days from 
open-loop Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) to closed-loop ECLSS.  That 
switch decreases the need for consumables at higher mission durations but increases the spares 
required to maintain those more complicated subsystems.  
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Figure 2: Overview of Habitat Mass and Different Habitat Concepts 
 
In this paper, the habitat and spares costs were estimated using the Project Cost Estimating 
Capability (PCEC) tool, the results are intended to provide a rough idea of the trend based on the 
habitat mass and an assumed level of heritage, not a precise estimate.  The launch costs (for the 
habitation systems only) assumed a fixed cost per kilogram to trans-lunar injection (~$24,000/kg).  
The operations cost are assumed to be constant with mission duration at 50 percent of current ISS 
operations and maintenance costs.   
One limitation of this cost analysis results from the assumption of the habitat lifetime being 
equal to a single mission duration.  For a full understanding of the habitat costs, a full campaign 
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must be considered, including habitat reuse, multiple mission scenarios, and other changes from 
the baseline orbital mission. 
Figure 3 presents the dependency of the non-propulsion system cost on the total mission 
duration.  The difference in the total cost for these four categories between two given mission 
durations would be available to spend on more advanced transportation systems to achieve the 
reduced total mission duration. From the figure, cost decreases nearly linearly as total mission 
duration decreases.  Decreasing total mission duration has a weak impact on habitat dry mass, the 
primary driver for habitat cost, above ~300 days.  Below 300 days, the change to open-loop ECLSS, 
and therefore reduced spares cost, increases the slope of the total cost savings.  To give the reader a 
sense of scale, the total cost without transportation, which includes both development and unit 
costs, is on the order of $10 billion at high total mission durations. 
 
 
Figure 3: Dependency of Non-Propulsion System Costs on Total Mission Duration 
 
C. Risk 
The risk impact determines the chance that the system will fail to achieve its mission, lose the 
crew, or endanger their long-term health.  This impact is comprised of the crew health risks, system 
reliability, and operational risks.  Crew health risks encompass the radiation and microgravity 
effects on humans during long-duration, deep space missions, and have a significant dependency on 
the total mission duration.  Other mitigation strategies besides reduced mission duration are not 
incorporated in this study.  The system reliability is fixed in this study by varying the spares mass 
(modeled as a cost driver) as a function of mission duration..  An alternative approach, not 
considered in this study, is assessing the variation in system reliability for a fixed spares mass.  
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Finally, the operational risks are typically event-driven and have a weak dependency on total 
mission duration.  Table 3 presents the overview of the risk impact. 
 
Table 3: Overview of the Risk Impact 
Component Description 
Crew Health: 
Radiation 
Exposure to deep space radiation poses a health risk to the astronauts 
during and after the mission; shielding technology and mission 
duration determine exposure, but policy determines the acceptable 
level of exposure. 
Crew Health: 
Microgravity 
Long term exposure to microgravity has negative impacts on the 
skeletal, muscular, and cardiovascular systems. 
System Reliability The likelihood that the habitation system will fail before the mission 
is completed contributes to the mission risk, but this effect is 
accounted for with spares mass in this analysis. 
Operational Risks Other risks that exist in operation include micrometeoroid and orbital 
debris, engine burns, launch failure, etc. that are weak functions of 
mission duration given equivalent concepts of operations. 
 
The radiation portion of the crew health risk has two parts: radiation exposure and the Risk of 
Exposure Induced Death (REID).  The radiation exposure is the amount of radiation that the crew is 
exposed to during the orbital mission, from both solar radiation and galactic cosmic rays.  As shown 
in Figure 4, exposure is linear with total mission duration.  The probability of REID is a combination 
of the radiation exposure with the impact on the human body, and it may see a superlinear increase 
with total mission duration.  Biological uncertainty also drives error bands on the radiation risk as 
REID can range from 2-14 percent.  For these reasons, the crew health risk due to radiation is likely 
sensitive to total mission duration, and if that risk is above the acceptable limit (current guidance is 
3 percent probability of REID), a shorter total mission duration or other mitigation strategy would 
be necessary. 
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Figure 4: Estimate of Radiation Exposure for Various Mission Durations [Data Source: 4] 
 
There are multiple aspects of crew health risk due to microgravity.  Prolonged exposure to a 
microgravity environment affects a number of the human body’s systems, including the skeletal, 
muscular, and cardiovascular systems.  Examples of these impacts include 1.0 to 1.5 percent of bone 
loss per month, loss of muscle strength & endurance (particularly for lower extremities), and 
development of kidney stones resulting from bone degradation [5]. 
It is challenging to model the impacts on the human body due to long duration exposure in deep 
space.  The majority of data on the subject is from experience on Mir and ISS, most of which is for 
durations of 6 months or less.  Currently, exercise is used to mitigate the effects of microgravity on 
the crew, with ISS crew members exercising 2.5 hours for six out of every seven days.  It is still 
unclear the number of exercise hours required per day for a Mars orbital mission. 
There are multiple ways to handle the system reliability risk.  Two common strategies are to 
design to a reliability (used in this analysis) or to design to a cost.  When designing to a reliability, 
the reliability to which the system will be designed is specified, then the required spares mass and 
component reliability are computed.  For the habitats analyzed in this paper, a system reliability of 
0.995 is maintained for all mission durations.  This converts system reliability from a risk metric to 
a cost metric.  As demonstrated in Figure 5, the risk is driven as much by the uncertainty in the 
system failure rate as the total mission duration.  The analysis performed, based on Stromgren et al. 
(2016), incorporates the uncertainty in Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) as seen on ISS to 
determine the range of spares mass required to maintain a 0.995 habitat system reliability. 
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Figure 5: Uncertainty in the System Failure Rate is More Impactful than Total Mission 
Duration [6] 
 
The other strategy, which was not employed in this study, is to design to a specific cost 
(equivalent to spares mass and system failure rate).  Using this strategy, the failure rate of the 
elements and the total spares mass available are specified, and then the system reliability falls out 
as function of operational time.  If this approach had been used, risk would have been driven by the 
total mission duration because the risk increases the longer the system operates. Thus, the impact 
of total mission duration on system reliability depends in part on the design objective for reliability: 
whether to design to a fixed reliability (method employed in this study), or to a fixed cost (not 
considered in this study). 
D. Performance 
There are several potential approaches for achieving reduced total mission duration.  These 
approaches can be categorized into three categories for the performance trades, as shown in Table 
4.  Changing the type of trajectory, or mission design, can change the total mission duration and 
performance requirements on the propulsive vehicle.  A change in propulsive technology can 
achieve shorter mission durations by improving the specific impulse, propellant mass, and, in the 
case of electric propulsion, power.  Changing the propulsion technology has the possibility to 
dramatically change how a mission is flown, and therefore has a large impact on the total mission 
duration.  Impulsive, high-thrust trajectories have different characteristics from electric, low-thrust 
propulsion, and converting from one technology to another can alter the very nature of the mission 
design.  Finally, the propulsion concept of operations could change to include propellant resupply, 
different aggregation strategies, and propellant production at the destination.  These concept of 
operations changes can have dramatic impact on the capability of the transportation system. 
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Table 4: Overview of the Performance Trade Options 
Component Description 
Mission Design Change the type of trajectory to change the mission duration and the 
performance requirements, includes constant thrust vs. impulsive 
thrust trade 
Propulsion Technology Change the characteristics of the vehicle to achieve the performance 
requirements (e.g. changing propulsion technology to increase 
specific impulse). 
Operational Change the concept of operations to include options such as  
propellant refueling, aggregation and/or pre-deploy, ISRU, etc. 
 
To understand how the performance trades impact the total mission duration, Figure 6 
presents representative missions from four mission classes: total mission durations of years, 
months, weeks, and days.  The “Years” mission class is comparable to the missions that have been 
designed for previous Mars architectures [7,8] where orbital mechanics dictate long stay times and 
interplanetary Times of Flight (TOF) above 100 days.  Reductions in time of flight for this mission 
class has limited impact on the total mission duration because the orbital mechanics dictate that the 
stay time increase.  The “Months” mission class has significant variety, but the mission shown has a 
very short stay time and transits off of the optimal return date.  The performance, denoted by total 
change in velocity, or ΔV, is an order of magnitude greater for the “Months” mission class over the 
“Years” mission class.  Trajectories in the “Years” mission class use current transportation 
technologies, and those of the “Months” mission class would require significant technological 
advancement.  “Weeks” and “Days” mission classes would require a physics breakthrough to 
achieve those types of mission durations which have extremely high performance requirements. 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Trajectories with Different Total Mission Duration Classes 
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Figure 7 presents a case study using inert mass fraction sizing to determine the increase in 
performance (specific impulse and mass ratio) needed to achieve a reduced TOF.  The baseline, 
Minimum ΔV, case has a total mission duration of 940 days and times of flight of 210 days each way.  
The performance required to depart cislunar space is achievable with conventional or near-term 
propulsion technologies--LOX/CH4, LOX/LH2, and Nuclear Thermal Rockets (NTR)--at reasonable 
initial masses.  However, decreasing the times of flight by 50 percent only decreases the total 
mission duration by 7 percent.  At the same time, that trajectory would only be achievable with 
NTR, the best performing and least developed of those propulsion technologies, which would still 
require six Space Launch System launches of flight hardware and propellant.  The takeaway from 
this case study is that increases in specific impulse and mass ratio only enable small reductions in 
total mission duration. 
 
 
Figure 7: Case Study of Decreasing Time of Flight for Impulsive Trajectories 
 
Technologies are being researched that would enable significant decreases in trip time, 
including the VASIMR engine [4].  Table 5 presents the needed performance from this engine 
concept to achieve total mission durations below one year (would fall in the “Months” mission 
class).  Mission durations under one year would require orders of magnitude improvement in 
power and specific power.  Total mission durations of weeks or days would require a physics 
breakthrough (e.g. propellantless propulsion). 
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Table 5: Needed Performance for Mission Durations Less Than One Year 
 Current Performance Needed Performance 
Isp (s) ~3,000a ~5,000c 
Power (MW) 0.01b 10 - 100c 
Specific Power (kg/kW) 150b 1 - 10c 
aHERMeS Thruster, bKilo-Power Nuclear Reactor Concept, cVASIMR 
IV. Key Findings and Discussion 
For the Mars orbital mission, reducing total mission duration potentially has the greatest 
impact on risk, primarily crew health risk, but risk impacts have large uncertainty. Long duration, 
deep space missions may exceed the current limits on radiation exposure, and risk uncertainty is 
driven by biological uncertainty, which can dominate the difference in risk due to mission duration.  
System failure risk is mitigated by increasing spares mass, while crew health risk mitigation 
strategies beyond reduced mission duration have not been explored in this paper. Reducing total 
mission duration also decreases habitat cost, but this reduction is dominated by the increased 
transportation system cost (via the mass).  Finally, the change in benefit associated with reducing 
total mission duration is negligible. 
Reductions in total mission duration can be achieved by a continuum of operational and 
technological solutions: mission design, increasingly efficient propulsion, and physics 
breakthroughs.  Figure 8 presents this continuum and the types of mission classes it enables.  
Changes in mission design can reduce total mission duration while utilizing the same type of 
propulsion technology.  Achieving missions below two years in duration require more efficient 
propulsion technology, while achieving missions under one year duration requires orders of 
magnitude improvement in technology and/or a physics breakthrough, such as propellantless 
propulsion. 
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Figure 8: The Continuum of Performance Solutions to Decrease Total Mission Duration 
 
Figure 9 presents the behavior of habitat cost, notional propulsion cost, and crew health risk to 
show a knee in the curve of total cost vs. total mission duration (and therefore risk).  The habitation 
system cost decreases with mission duration, but the propulsion system, based on the mass at 
departure for Mars, will increase exponentially in cost as total mission duration decreases.  
Combining the transportation and habitation costs shows a knee in the curve where more 
reductions in mission duration for a given propulsion technology would increase cost rapidly.  A 
further decrease in mission duration can be realized by changing propulsion technology, which 
would have a knee in the curve at lower total mission duration.  It is important to note that the 
propulsion cost curves are notional, and therefore the location of the knee in the curve is only 
representative of how to interpret the behavior of the plot.  
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Figure 9: Notional Cost of Transportation and Habitation as a Function of Total Mission 
Duration 
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper assessed the sensitivity of the total impact of reducing the total mission duration of a 
human Mars orbital mission, including benefit, cost, and risk. Reductions in total mission duration 
can be achieved by a continuum of operational and technological solutions: alter the mission design, 
utilize increasingly efficient propulsion, and the potential for physics breakthroughs. The key 
findings from this assessment reveal that reducing total mission duration potentially has the 
greatest impact on risk, which is driven by the mitigation of crew health risks (e.g. exposure to 
radiation and microgravity).  Risk impacts have large uncertainty, and more research would be 
necessary to better understand and model these risks.  The reduction in non-transportation (e.g. 
habitation) systems’ cost resulting from reduced total mission duration are most sensitive below 
~300 days, but those cost savings are dominated by the increased in-space transportation cost to 
go faster.  Finally, for a Mars orbital mission, the change in benefit associated with reducing total 
mission duration is negligible. 
To see meaningful changes in these impacts for the orbital mission, the total mission duration 
must be reduced dramatically, potentially below a one year round-trip.  Performance requirements 
increase exponentially for decreased total mission duration in those time scales, often requiring 
orders of magnitude improvement in propulsion technology.   
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